Article 4
Status: Draft | Published
Group I: Housing, Land, and Household Stability
#housing #ownership #anti-capture
1. Problem Definition
Institutional concentration in single-family housing can distort prices, reduce owner access, and create speculative bubbles.
2. Principles Invoked
3. Constraints
- Must respect property rights.
- Must avoid arbitrary seizure.
4. Proposal
A. Institutional Ownership Cap
Institutional entities may not own more than X% of regional single-family stock.
B. Time-Limited Holding
Corporations may hold for redevelopment only.
Mandatory divestment within a fixed window (e.g., 24 months).
Progressive holding tax thereafter.
C. Beneficial Ownership Registry
Full transparency of ownership structures.
5. Financing
- Registry funded via property transaction fees.
- Holding tax funds housing supply expansion.
6. Incentives & Failure Modes
Risk:
- Shell ownership evasion, mitigated by strict beneficial owner disclosure.
- Reduced rental supply, mitigated by monitoring supply elasticity.
7. Evidence
Concentration correlates with price volatility and reduced homeownership rates.
8. Metrics
- Owner-occupancy rate
- Institutional share of stock
- Median price-to-income ratio
9. Counterpoints
- Left: Should extend to multi-family.
- Right: Interferes with property rights.
- Center: Market distortion risk.
10. Common Ground
Single-family homes primarily serve household formation, not asset monopolization.
11. Pilot + Sunset
Regional pilot in high-concentration markets with predefined sunset and renewal rules .
12. Non-Contradiction Check
Respects property rights while preventing systemic concentration harm under non-harm limits .